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In 1999, only one of three US scientists and engineers was employed to do R&D and, in 
several countries over the last forty to fifty years, employment of skilled workers for 
R&D purposes appears not to have kept pace with the overall increase in the supply of 
skilled workers. Low utilization of R&D personnel implies low growth per human 
capital endowments. To analyze the low R&D utilization/low growth equilibria, we set 
up an endogenous growth model in which firms set fair wages and which allows for an 
analysis of changes in the utilization rate of R&D workers. We find that the rise in under 
utilization and the fall in growth per human capital to be consistent with the increase in 
the demand for higher education. This could be interpreted as the “consumption” 
element in higher education has received an increased importance yielding a low 
growth effect of higher education.  The results also point at problems of correctly 
measuring actual human capital inputs in firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Much of the research on the determinants of economic growth has focused 
on the inputs of R&D workers in research departments. Given the 
importance that central contributions in the growth literature place on R&D 
inputs for economic development, it is surprising to find that only low 
shares of all educated R&D workers are actually employed to perform 
R&D. For instance, in the US in 1999 almost 11 million scientists and 
engineers were employed in the US labor market but of these less than a 
third, only 3,5 million, were active in science and engineering (S&E).
1 The 
corresponding figures are not available for the European union. However, 
figures based on “human resources in science and technology” (HRST), a 
considerably broader definition than “scientists and engineers” reveals that 
utilization rates are low also in Europe. In 1999, 65 million workers were 
classified as being educated for employment in science and technology 
(S&T) but of these only 42.3 million, or less than two out of three, were 
actually employed in S&T.
2  
An important issue is also if there is an increasing trend in under 
utilization. Data do not allow us to explore the long run trends in shares of 
workers in S&E or in S&T. However, for forty to fifty years back we may 
compare trends in workers having acquired higher education to workers 
actually employed in R&D. Figure 1 compares the total number of workers 
above age 25 with higher education to the number of scientists and 
engineers engaged in R&D, for the US, West Germany
3, UK, France and 
Japan from 1960 to 2000.
4 With the exception of Japan, ‘Scientists and 
engineers in R&D’ does not keep pace with the number of workers with 
higher education. Particularly in the UK and in recent decades the US, 
there is a widening gap between the two curves. In four cases, observations 
are available also for single years during the 1950:s. Figure 2 show that the 
trends remain for the UK, and France. For the US, R&D employment starts 
to lag behind overall higher education rates in the 1960:s. For Japan, R&D 
employment grew faster than overall higher education in the 1950:s, which 
is consistent with this country’s high growth period. 
                                                           
1 See Science and Engineering Indicators-2002. 
2That S&T is a much broader concept than S&E is shown by the fact that of workers in 
S&T only 19 % are classified as workers in S&E. See for instance OECD (2002). 
3 Germany after unification 1990. 
4 Data on scientists and engineers are taken from   
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~chad/Sources50.asc and the number of workers with higher 
education from ftp://ftp.worldbank.org/pub/decweb/grthdata/barro&lee1993. 2 
The low utilization rates of R&D workers in the research departments in 
recent years in the US and the EU, that we reported above, together with 
Figures 1 and 2, suggest a long-term decrease in the utilization rates. While 
for Japan the two time series grow at approximately the same rate during 
the last forty years, the trend that employment of workers in R&D does not 
keep pace with higher education is most clear in the case of United 
Kingdom. 
Certainly, this is suggestive evidence and it is not clear that the 
utilization of R&D workers as a share of the supply of ‘scientists and 
engineers’ has shown a similar trend over the last fifty years as in Figure 1. 
It appears quite clear, however, that supply is not a restrictive variable 
since less than a third of ‘scientists and engineers’ in the US is used for 
R&D purposes. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a theoretical model that is 
consistent with the long run decrease in the rate of utilization of R&D 
personnel for R&D tasks. The strategy is to explore an endogenous growth 
model with fair wage setting. Firms have incentives to raise the wage above 
the market clearing level but unlike the standard efficiency wage model 
where this generates unemployment, in this model the higher wage lowers 
the utilization rates of R&D workers as R&D workers are relegated to 
production with consequences for growth and welfare.  
The study is also intended to increase our understanding of how 
incentive systems to promote R&D workers’ efficiency affect economic 
growth. A growth model with fair wage setting is shown to involve 
mechanisms that hamper the positive growth effects of increases in the 
number of R&D workers. As supply of R&D workers increases, firms’ 
utilization of R&D workers decreases, human capital per R&D worker 
drops as does their work effort.
5  
                                                           
5 Several arguments favor the idea that efficiency wage setting is of particular 
significance to workers like researchers, civil engineers and others that are directly 
involved in improving the quality of goods. First, efficiency wage theory assumes some 
latitude in workers’ effort which seems easy to accept for R&D workers since their 
effort to a lesser degree than that of workers on the factory floor depends on 
technological factors and cannot easily be monitored. Secondly, efficiency wage setting 
is particularly important for researchers since the performance of individual R&D 
workers must be crucial to the firm. Without any breakthroughs in the research lab of 
the medical company or in the design department in the auto company, firms’ survival 
is threatened in the long run. The likelihood of a research breakthrough, in turn, hinges 
on the incentives that R&D workers have to work hard and it is not surprising that 
studies show that management is most concerned with maintaining good relations with 
workers as a way to prevent workers from slacking off. See in particular Campbell and 
Kamlani (1997). 3 
We investigate the effects of long run changes that characterize developed 
countries, including changes in demography, in demand for higher 
education, in the quality of teaching and in retirement ages. Of these, we 
find that workers’ increased preferences for higher education is consistent 
with the stylized fact that growth is lower than suggested by the increases 
in human capital. A long run fall in the utilization rate of R&D workers is 




2 The model 
 
Some general comments 
 
We assume a continuum of industries that are indexed by ω ∈[0,1]. Firms 
allocate R&D workers to participate in R&D races to improve quality in 
perfect competition with other firms. In each industry, firms are 
distinguished by quality j of the products they manufacture. The higher the 
integer value of j the higher is the quality. R&D workers’ innovation 
implies that the firm acquires the ability, represented by a blue-print, to 
manufacture a higher quality product. If the state-of-the-art quality in an 
industry is j , the next firm to win an R&D race becomes the single 
manufacturer of a j +1 quality product. Since firms are Bertrand price-
setters, a winner of an R&D race will price lower quality competitors out of 
business and take over the market in its industry. Over time, as new 
innovations push industries up the quality ladder the economy grows. 
These are the basic ideas of the Grossman-Helpman (1991a) growth model. 
Labor is, in our model, of two kinds: R&D workers, r L , and production 
workers,  p L . The number of workers in each category as well as the length 
of R&D workers’ education is determined endogenously. While R&D 
workers can work as production workers, production workers cannot work 
as R&D workers. Assume that a share u of  r L is allocated to production, we 
will have  pr Lu L + workers in production and(1 ) r uLe − workers in the labs 
where e is R&D workers’ effort. At each instant firms make a decision 
about how many of the R&D workers that should be employed in the lab 
and how many should be employed in production. One unit of production 
workers is required to produce one unit of output, regardless of quality. We 
treat the wage rate of production workers as the numeraire and letwdenote 
the relative wage of R&D workers. 4 
 
Utility maximizing consumers  
 
All consumers live forever and maximize discounted utility from 
consumption of goods: 
log
s -t
0 U       U (t)dt, e
ρ ∞ ≡ ∫                        (1) 
 
where  ρ  is the subjective rate of discount and  log  ()
s Ut  is each 
consumer’s static utility at time t, which is given by an additive utility 
function:  
 




 U (t) d(j,t, )d   ω ω λ = ∫ ∑                           (2) 
 
(, ,) dj t ω  denotes the quantity consumed of a product of quality j 
produced in industry ω  at time t. The parameterλ>1 represents the extent 
to which higher quality products improve on lower quality products, i.e., 
the size of the step on the quality ladder.  
At each point in timet, each consumer allocates expenditureEto 
maximize, log Ut
s() , given the prevailing market prices and that the second 
term is zero, i.e. at its equilibrium value. Solving this budget allocation 
problem yields a unit elastic demand function 
 
, d=E / p                             (3) 
 
whered is quantity demanded and pis the market price for the product in 
each industry with the lowest quality adjusted price. The quantity 
demanded for all other products is zero.  
Given this static demand behavior, each consumer chooses the path of 
expenditure over time to maximize (1) subject to the usual inter-temporal 







ρ                             (4) 
 
i.e., a constant expenditure path is optimal if and only if the market 
interest rate, r, equals ρ . As we restrict attention to steady state properties 
of the model, ρ  is the equilibrium interest rate throughout time and 
                                                           
6 See Grossman and Helpman (1991a). 5 
consumer expenditure is constant over time. We let E denote aggregate 
steady state consumer expenditures. 
 
 
The behavior of firms 
 
a) The product market 
 
One unit of labor produces one unit of output regardless of quality. Since 
production workers’ wage rate has been normalized to one, every firm has 
a constant marginal cost equal to one. When the researchers have 
innovated, the firm becomes the single producer of the state-of-the-art 
quality in its industry. 
We consider now the profits earned by a firm that has innovated 
successfully and become the state-of-the-art producer. With the previous 
state-of-the-art producer charging a price of 1, which is the lowest price 
such that losses are avoided, the new quality good producer earns 
instantaneous profits 
 
1 p    (p- ) /p, E (p) =     







             (5) 
 
where p is the price set by the producer. Equation (5) implies that profits 
are maximized by choosing  p λ = . Therefore, this producer earns as a 
reward for its innovative activity a profit flow equal to (1-1/λ)E. None of 
the other firms in the industry can do any better than break even by selling 
nothing at all. 
 
b) R&D inputs 
 
So far, we have followed a standard Grossman-Helpman set-up of a growth 
model. In industry ω  at time t, we let i l  denote the number of R&D 
workers employed by firm i. In a model with fair wage setting, however, it 
is the employment of R&D workers in efficiency units that matters and the 
amount of human capital of the R&D workers. Hence,  ()i eh S l , where e is 
effort exerted by the R&D workers and h(S) is the human capital per R&D 
worker which is a function of the number of years, S, that the worker has 
spent in tertiary school.  () () i
i
eh S eh S = ∑ ll  is then the industry-wide R&D 6 
employment in efficiency units as well as the instantaneous probability that 
some firm will be rewarded for R&D success. Both e and h(S) will be 
defined later. Individual R&D firms behave competitively and treat pas 
given, not influenced by their choice of  i l . 
 Letυ denote the expected discounted rewards for winning an R&D race. 
For a given effort e, each firm chooses its R&D employment  i l  to 
maximize instantaneous profits that equal  ii ew υ − ll . For a steady state 
profit maximization equilibrium, the optimal level of inputs of R&D 
workers implies that  / we υ = .  
 
c) R&D workers’ effort and firms’ wage setting 
 
The empirical literature offers much support for the fair wage approach to 
efficiency wage setting.
7 In this section we derive its crucial behavioral 
element, the effort function, from the utility maximizing behavior of R&D 
workers. 
Rather than allowing for open unemployment (as in for instance Akerlof 
(1982)), we assume that when firms for efficiency wage reasons raise the 
R&D workers’ wage above the competitive level, some R&D workers, 
determined by a random draw, are relegated to the factory floor. Since this 
share in efficiency wage models is formally identical to the unemployment 
rate, we represent this under utilization rate by u, which defines the share 
of R&D workers that is unemployed in their capacity of R&D workers. 
The worker supplies a higher effort level,  i e , the higher is the offered 
wage relative other R&D workers’ wage i ww . This comparison with peers 
is uncontroversial.  
For reasons of tractability we assume that work outside the R&D lab is 
homogeneous. However, to recognize the existence of a number of 
qualified work tasks, like in top administration, comparable to the ones that 
R&D workers perform in the lab, we assume that R&D workers compare 
                                                           
7 See Bewley (1998) who finds much support for the ”fair wage” version of efficiency 
wage theory. The fair wage efficiency wage model is also supported by a large number 
of other studies like Blinder and Choi (1990) and Campbell and Kamlani (1997) for the 
US, Kaufman (1984) for the UK, and Agell and Lundborg (1995) for Sweden. All 
theses studies are based on interviews (or questionnaires) with the people that actually 
set the wages in firms. Interestingly, using an experimental approach, Fehr and Falk 
(1999) corroborates the finding from the survey studies. The consistent message in these 
studies, carried out in countries with highly diverging labor market institutions (like the 
US, UK and Sweden) and based on different methods (like interviews or questionnaires, 
and experiments), justifies the specification of a growth model on the principal finding 
that fair wage considerations determine effort of R&D workers. 7 
their wage to the outside wage. Thus, also the relative wage i w  enters.
8 We 
shall show, however, that our results do not hinge on this assumption. 
In the study by Campbell and Kamlani (1997), 13.3 percent of firms 
claim that high wages is the most important factor to stimulate effort of 
white-collar workers and high wages is ranked as the second most 
important factor to prevent workers from slacking off on the job. The first 
two arguments i ww  and i w that determine effort are therefore related to the 
individual R&D worker’s place in the wage hierarchy. 
Moreover, the higher is the under utilization rate, u, the more anxious 
will the R&D worker be to keep the job in the lab, and hence the higher 
effort level is expected by the firm. The unemployment rate is a standard 
argument in efficiency wage theory and almost ten percent of the firms in 
the Campbell and Kamlani study claim that high unemployment is the most 
important factor that raises effort of white-collar workers. The 
unemployment (under utilization) argument is in their study somewhat 
more important to white-collar workers than to other workers.  









β α φ = −+ +        (6) 
 
where  1 α β +< (to ensure that effort is declining in the wage) and 
0 a > (to ensure that a zero wage is not optimal).
10   
  As firms set the wage by minimizing  / ii we . From the first order 
condition and after imposing  i ww = , we get: 
 
                                                           
8 Agell and Lundborg (1995) find first that workers compare their wages to others not 
only in the same firm but also in other firms and secondly that firms consider reduced 
work effort to be a likely reaction to “unfair” wages. Since inter-firm comparisons are 
particularly common among white-collar workers for which education as well as work 
content is heterogeneous, this might suggest the existence of non-peer comparisons.  
9 Assume for R&D worker i an effort utility function 
2 () (1 2) ( )
i i i Ue e a w u ww
βφ αα =− − − −
l where utility falls in effort and  rises in the 
individual’s relative wage. Utility of having a job is also high when under utilization is 
high. The worker determines effort to maximize 
i U
l which yields 
() 0 ()
i i ea wu Ue ww
βφ αα δδ =− − − − = . 
10 See Akerlof (1982) for these requirements.  Equilibrium utility of effort becomes 
*2 /2
i Ue =−
l which, as in the main text, is assumed negligible compared to the utility 
derived from consumption, 
S









                    (7) 
 
and for equilibrium effort we obtain (from  i ww =  in (6)):  
 
ea wu
β φ =− + + .                  (8) 
 
 
Endogenous labor supplies and education  
While several studies have shown that schooling is of empirical importance 
to growth, we have, so far, said nothing about how much education workers 
demand.
11 To find inner solutions, we need to ensure that not everyone 
chooses the same vocation. We therefore assume that individuals are 
heterogeneous as they value education differently. While the monetary 
gains are identical for all workers with the same vocation, workers may 
value education differently in terms of social status, of having an 
intellectual work, of the personal development that education may offer etc. 
Let  V denote this value of education discounted over the period of 
education and work.
12 V is uniformly distributed on the interval  0,V ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ . 
Each individual compares the present value of an optimal number of 
years of schooling to the present value of no education.
13 Working life is T  
years. With S  years of schooling, the individual accumulates human capital 
amounting to () hS which is an increasing and concave function.S years of 
education yields (besides the value V ) a flow salary of () wh S  when 
employed as an R&D worker and wherew now is the reward to one unit of 
human capital. If relegated to the factory floor, the human capital has no 
extra value and the worker receives a unit wage. 
To determine the optimal number of years of schooling, the individual 
must consider the benefits and costs of marginal additional schooling,dS . 
The gains to be made from extra schooling equal the probability of working 
as an R&D worker(1 ) u −  times the extra return in this state '( ) wh S . Thus, the 
                                                           
11 For the relation between education and growth, see, for instance, Hall and Jones 
(1999) and Bils and Klenow (2000). 
12 We let V include the period in school so that V does not vary with the number of years 
in school. 
13 Our formulation of the determination of the optimal years of schooling is inspired by 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) who, though, assume homogenous labor. See also 
Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983). 9 
marginal benefits [ ] (1 ) '( ) uw h S d S −  can be reaped during the period tS + to 
tT +  and the present value of these earnings equal 
[ ] () ( 1 ) ' ( ) /
ST ee u w h S d S
ρρ ρ
−− −− . During dS  the student has no income and 
had he worked, income would have been (1 ) ( ) uw hS u − + such that the 
marginal cost of an extra unit of schooling is the forgone 
earnings [ ] (1 ) ( )
S eu w h S u d S
ρ − −+ during the period tS +  to tSd S + + . The first-
order condition, i.e. marginal benefits equal to marginal cost, yields   
 
() (1 ) ( )
'( ) (1 ) ( )
ST u
eh S
hS u w h S
ρ ρ − ⎡ ⎤
−= + ⎢ ⎥ − ⎣ ⎦
.                 (9) 
 
The optimal S solves (9). The present value of lifetime earnings of an 











−− − Λ= = − ∫ . This value should be 
compared to the alternative of spending the first S years in school and then 
receiving, for the remaining years, a flow salary of wh(S) when employed 
as an R&D worker and 1 when at the factory floor. Add to this the 
subjective value of education, V, discounted and we get a total present 
value of optimal education as  
[] []
() () 11
(1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )
tT tT
tt S T T
e
tS t
eu w h S u d e V d e e u w h S u e V
ρτ ρτ ρ ρ ρ ττ
ρρ
++
−− −− − − −
+
Λ= − + + = − − + + − ∫∫
 
The worker prefers optimal education to no education if  eu Λ≥ Λ. The 
marginal worker is indifferent between optimal education (obtained from 



















.           (10) 
 
For this marginal worker, discounted money income from being 
unskilled exceeds expected discounted money income from optimal 
education. If, for a worker,  * VV ≥  he then chooses education and if  * VV <  
he chooses no education. The share of the fixed labor force N that opts for 
higher education is then determined as  (* ) / mV VV =− yielding 
  
r Lm N =               (11) 
and  10 
 
(1 ) p Lm N = − .                (12) 
 
At each instant, a share / ST of the total number of r L is in school, a 
share(1 / )(1 ) ST u −− of  r L is working in the R&D departments, and a share 
(1 / ) STu − of  r L  is working as production workers. 
 
 
Labor market equilibrium 
We assume that R&D workers can work in the lab and on the factory floor 
while production workers only can work on the factory floor, but not in the 
lab. If demand for R&D workers drop, R&D workers are driven down on 
the factory floor and have to accept lower pay.
14 With production workers’ 
wage equal to 1, each producer employs / E λ  workers for production. Full 
employment in the labor market for production workers then implies that 
 
(1 / ) / , pr LS T u L E λ + −=    (13) 
 
holds. Supply of production labor, i.e. p L  plus the number of workers that 
are not hired in the R&D lab,  r uL , equals demand for labor. As firms do 
R&D they demand l workers per industry. Thus, full employment of R&D 
labor in terms of number of workers(1 ) r uL −
 implies that  
 
(1 / )(1 ) . r ST uL − −= l       (14) 
 
We may now also determine the rewards for winning R&D races,υ. We 
know from equation (4) that in any steady state equilibrium the market 
interest rate must equalρ . The profit flow(1 1/ )E λ − , derived from (5), must 
be discounted by ρ , and we must also consider that producer of the state-
of-the-art commodity eventually is driven out of business by other firms’ 
further innovations. As noted in section “R&D inputs” this occurs with 
instantaneous probability  () eh S lduring time span dt . Since  / we υ = we 
obtain, as an equilibrium R&D condition, thatυ equals:  
                                                           
14 We could have assumed that R&D workers get unemployed. However, with 
competitive wages for production workers these workers would be fully employed and 
it seems to go against empirical facts to allow for unemployment among researchers 












               (15) 
 
where the right hand side represents the costs 






We now can derive a growth equation that is considerably richer in nature 
than in standard models of this type. Growth obtains derived as 
(1 / )(1 ) ( ) log r ge L S T u h S λ =− − . We shall denote (1 / ) r LS T −  the “measurable” 
educated R&D workers since this is the variable to be found in statistics on 
the number of R&D workers that firms employ. As before, effort, e, must 
be considered and that firms need not fully utilize all R&D workers, but 
only the share1 u − . With endogenous education, we must also recognize 
that the relevant measure of R&D should also consider that years of 
schooling may change the amount of R&D actually used by firms.  
In their empirical study, Bils and Klenow (2000) specify a human capital 
function consistent with mincerian wage equations. As do Hall and Jones 
(1999) and others we follow their approach and assume that each individual 
worker’s human capital is a function of the efficiency of education and of 
the individual’s schooling years. We assume that the efficiency in higher 
education is a function of the stock of human capital,  r hL , which is raised to 
a parameter η. If this parameter is positive, the quality of schooling is 
increasing in human capital. The number of school years affects human 
capital depending on the university premium. We then have a human 
capital stock of the individual determined as 
log((1- ) ) ()
uwuS
r hh L e
η + =  or  
 
(1 ) (log((1- ) ) )/(1 ) uwuS
r hL e
ηη η − + − =           (16) 
 
where the term log((1 ) ) uw u −+  in the exponent is the endogenous 
university premium.
16  
                                                           
15 There is a “potential” supply of human capital of  (1 )
r Le h ST − .  
16 An advantage with this formulation is that we can calibrate the model so as to make it 
consistent with empirically relevant university premiums. Note that the university 
premium is here defined in terms of the wage per unit of human capital, i.e. w, rather 
than in terms of the flow salary of educated workers, wh. Two deviations from the Bils 
and Klenow model should be pointed out: First, as cohorts do not change over time in 12 
 
Expenditures 
Steady state consumer expenditure E must equal total wage incomes plus 
interest income on assets owned. The value of all assets equals the stock 
market value of all producers of state-of-the-art goods, i.e. / we υ = in 
equilibrium andρυ  are the interest incomes. Consumer expenditures then 
become 
  




3 The simulations 
 
We assume the following parameter values and factor supplies: λ =1.2, 
implies that an innovation represents a 20% improvement and that 
consumers are willing to pay 20% more for the improved good. The rate of 
discount is 5%,  ρ = .05. The parameters of the effort function cannot be 
settled on empirical grounds but are set toα = .25,β = .25, φ = .5 and a=1.0 
while η is set equal to 0.1 and V =1.46. These values are determined so as 
to yield what appears to be a reasonable basic solution. 
Parametersα andβ determine the curvature of the effort-wage relation. The 
total number of workers in the economy, N, is 10.0 and the number of 
active work years, T is set to 50. 
We want to capture economic changes of a very long run nature. The 
model allows for a study of long run changes in for instance population size 
(N), number of work years T (i.e. retirement age), taste for higher education 
V , and, finally, in the quality of higher education η. We are particularly 
interested to see if any of these changes are consistent with the stylized 
facts that R&D workers over time get under utilized and that growth in the 
OECD area has not kept pace with the number of R&D workers employed. 
Table 1 reports the results of these changes. 
The first column gives the basic solution. While we do not expect 
population increases to be able to explain the stylized facts, we start by 
analyzing the effects thereof to illustrate some basic workings of the model.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
model, the individual’s work experience does not enter in the determination of human 
capital and, secondly, the university premium is endogenous.  
 13 
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       5 
1)  Wage, w  1.164306 1.164088  1.164357  1.164765  1.163932 
2)  Effort, E  0.519382 0.519358  0.519388  0.519433  0.51934 
3)  School years,S   4.476104 4.487253  4.204502  4.709702  4.472637 
4)  Human Capital/capita, h   1.416278  1.418231 1.396431 1.434497 1.417032 
5) Total Human Capital, H  1.283457  1.297531 1.281651 1.284382 1.283947 
6) Under utilization, u  0.230994  0.231017 0.230988 0.230945 0.231034 
7) R&D workers in labs,  
(1 / )(1 ) r LS Tu −−   1.744801  1.761589 1.767091 1.723714 1.744679 
8) University premium, 
log((1 ) ) uw u −+   0.051674  0.051608 0.05169  0.051813 0.051561 
9) Growth, g  0.234002  0.236568 0.233673 0.234171 0.234091 
10) Production workers,  p L   7.508009  7.583339 7.491159 7.522984 7.508242 
11) Total R&D workers,  r L   2.268903  2.290803 2.297872 2.241339 2.268864 
12) R&D workers in school, 
(/) r LST  0.223088  0.225858 0.210969 0.235677 0.222895 
13) Share of population to 
higher education, m  0.249199  0.249174 0.250884 0.247702 0.249176 
14) Growth/(active R&D 
worker),  /( 1 / ) r gL ST −   0.103134  0.103269 0.101691 0.104478 0.103176 
15) Grwth/R&D worker in 
Labs,  /( 1 / ) ( 1 ) r gL ST u −−   0.134114  0.134292 0.132236 0.135852 0.134174     
 
 
We raise the population size by one percent (Column 2). Ceteris paribus 
this raises supply of both production workers and R&D workers (Rows 10 
and 11). An increase in the supply of production workers lowers the under 
utilization rate, while an increase in supply of R&D workers raises under 
utilization.
17 More workers imply that expenditures (i.e. 
(1 ) / . pr r EL u Lw u L w e ρ =+ + − + ) (not shown) go up which raises demand for 
both types of workers. In the new equilibrium, the number of 
productionworkers increases by 1.00 % and R&D workers by .97 % and we 
                                                           
17The relative increase in production workers is also manifested in a decrease in the 
share of total population opting for higher education, from 24.9199 to 24.9174 %. This 
drop in the share m implies an increase in the marginal worker’s value of education (V*) 
(not shown). 14 
obtain a net increase (from 23.099 to 23.102%) in the under utilization 
rate.
18  
The increased demand for R&D also spills over into an increase in 
students’ optimal schooling years, which rises to 4.487. With a larger 
number of R&D workers that each spend more time for education, human 
capital rises and growth is up. Thus, the standard result that population 
increases raise growth carries over to this model with an endogenous 
determination of education. 
We also see that growth per R&D worker rises, from .1031 to .1033 and 
that growth per R&D worker employed in the laboratories rises as well, 
from .1341 to .1343. This is as expected since each R&D worker acquires 
more schooling. From this we conclude that the stylized fact that growth 
has not been able to keep pace with available supplies of R&D is not due to 
population increases. On the contrary, population increases tend to raise, 
not lower, growth per R&D worker. 
A second phenomenon that we may analyze is an increase in the taste 
for higher education (Column (3)). We assume a one percent increase in 
the difference between V and the V* we obtain in the benchmark solution 
and it implies that the value of education, beside the university premium, 
rises. Given the normal distribution of the value of education, an increase 
in V  implies that the share of the population opting for tertiary education 
rises. We can think of this as an increase in the perceived social status of 
higher education. Of course, the share of workers preferring (optimal) 
education to no education rises, in this case from 24.9199% to 25.0884%. 
Since the valuation does not depend on the number of years of schooling, 
the injection to human capital formation is counteracted by a decrease in 
the optimal number of schooling years, from 4.48 to 4.20 years. Since more 
people prefer the high wage work, expenditures rise (not shown), profits 
from R&D also rise and demand for R&D workers goes up relative to 
demand for production workers. A consequence is that the under utilization 
rate goes down (from 23.0994% to 23.0988%). Hence, as more and more 
people over time go to higher education, we find that they choose fewer 
years of education and that firms employ an increasing share of them in 
R&D. With the parameter values assumed, the negative effect of the 
decrease in schooling years dominates and human capital formation drops. 
Consequently, the growth rate goes down at the same time as the number of 
workers in R&D rises. This case is therefore in line with the stylized fact 
                                                           
18 This increase in u implies that effort rises but, as firms then adjust the R&D wage per 
unit of human capital downwards, effort is reduced and the net effect is negative. This 
qualitative effect depends on the selected parameter values and the effect on effort is 
theoretically ambiguous. 15 
mentioned in the introduction that over time growth has not kept pace with 
the increase in the number of employed R&D workers. 
We turn now to analyzing the effects of higher efficiency in tertiary 
education (Column 4). Since human capital, here r hL  is assumed to reflect 
teachers’ human capital, a higher η, which we raise by 1 percent, implies 
that human capital per R&D worker is increasing more in the human 
capital of teachers.  
Each R&D worker’s human capital (h) rises (here from1.416278 to 
1.417032). This increase leads to several adjustments. As there is no direct 
effect on R&D demand, and h has increased, the share of workers that go to 
higher education, m, drops (from 24.9199 to 24.9176%) and the optimal 
number of school years falls (from 4.4761 to 4.4726). These effects 
counteract the initial human capital increase. Moreover, the increase in η 
implies that a given level of R&D may be produced by a lower number of 
R&D workers and we find that the under utilization rate of R&D workers 
increases (from 23.0994 to 23.1034%). While this tends to raise effort, a 
drop in the R&D wage reduces effort and we find that the net effect on 
effort is a decrease, (from .519382 to .51934). While there are several 
mechanisms that counteract the initial increase in human capital that a 
higher η gives rise to, the net effect is, as expected, a human capital and 
growth increase. As noted on the last two lines of Table 1, growth per R&D 
worker rises. 
The last long run change of modern economies that we analyze is 
reductions in retirement ages. Such reductions took place in most OECD 
countries during the 20:th century. Earlier retirement implies that the 
remaining number of years during which the educated worker can benefit 
from the return to his education falls. As we reduce T, we expect higher 
education to become less attractive and we see that the share of the 
population that acquires higher education drops from 24.92 to 24.77%. 
With this reduction in the supply of human capital and no change in the 
demand for R&D, we obtain an increase, to 4.71, of the optimal number of 
years of education. Thus, following a reform in the retirement age, higher 
education will be more unequally distributed to a lower number of workers 
that educate themselves for a longer period of time. It should then come as 
no surprise that human capital per R&D worker, h, rises.  
The under utilization of R&D workers drops slightly as the supply of 
R&D workers falls. This, in turn, tends to lower effort but the wage goes up 
implying a marginally higher effort. With increases in the share of highly 
educated employed in R&D labs and a higher wage, the equilibrium 
university premium is up. 16 
With the parameter values chosen, the overall supply of human capital, H, 
rises as does the growth rate and growth per employed R&D worker rises. 
Hence, like population increases, drops in the retirement age cannot 
explain the stylized fact that growth does not keep pace with R&D 
supplies. 
To summarize, we have found only one long run change that is 
consistent with the stylized fact that growth does not keep pace with 
increases in the employment of R&D workers. This change is the increase 
in demand for higher education which, among other things, leads reduces 
utilization rates of R&D. In the next section, we shall consider some 
empirical evidence of the model, in particular the utilization of R&D. 
 
 
4 Empirical evidence and concluding 
remarks  
 
Due to increased demand for higher education most OECD countries 
should have experienced long run increases in their supplies of R&D 
workers. One prediction of the model is that while the number of R&D 
workers increases relative to production workers, actual R&D inputs have 
grown less since i) utilization of R&D workers falls, and ii) the optimal 
number of schooling years drops. The first prediction implies that while the 
number of R&D workers employed in firms has increased, the number of 
R&D workers employed for R&D purposes may have increased much less. 
This may have prevented growth from increasing to the extent suggested by 
basic endogenous growth theory and as explored in Jones (1995a) and in 
several other papers.     
Our model also predicted that years of schooling should drop as the 
number of workers opting for higher education rises. It is a fact that the rich 
countries’ university reforms, that mainly and gradually took place during 
the 1960:s and 1970:s, implied the possibility for individuals to limit the 
number of years necessary for a PhD. Moreover, in many countries 
students may enter university and take courses that raise their human 
capital without completing a full degree. No long run data for completion 
times are available, however.
19 
                                                           
19 This is according to the OECD:s statistical bureau. Note also that since the number of 
years in mandatory schooling has increased, the number of years to complete a Ph.D. or 17 
Many have argued that a basic reason that growth has not kept pace with 
R&D inputs is that R&D workers’ productivity has fallen. The most 
common measure of R&D productivity is the number of patents per 
worker. Machlup (1962) showed that the rate of patents per R&D worker 
declined from 1920 to 1960 and Kortum (1996) reported that the number of 
patents per research worker shows a clear downward decline in the US 
from the 1960:s into the 1990:s. These findings are not restricted to the US; 
Evenson (1984) documents a worldwide decline. Moreover, Kortum (1993) 
reports a decline in patents per R&D expenditures across all manufacturing 
industries. According to Mansfield (1986), the decline is not caused by a 
falling propensity to patent innovations.
20 While this evidence does not 
constitute proofs that effort has fallen over time, they are nevertheless 
consistent with our model’s predictions since, for instance, population 
growth lowers R&D workers’ effort. Other possible explanations for the 
drop in R&D workers’ productivity have been offered by, for instance, 
Kortum (1996) and Segerstrom (1999). 
 Arguments could be made both for and against the view that changes in 
effort matter. In favor of this view are the convincing sociological and 
psychological evidence that fair wage considerations matter to workers’ 
behavior. Moreover, it is a fact that firms in R&D races have very strong 
incentives to extract top performance out of their R&D workers. Firms also 
go a long way to find compensation policies that serve the purpose of 
stimulating hard work, particularly among workers in key positions. Firms 
would hardly invest in such policies unless they considered effort to be a 
key variable for the performance of the firm or if they thought that changes 
in effort were of a short run nature. Agell and Lundborg (2002) shows that 
employees in Sweden improved the work performance during the 1990:s. 
There is also evidence, albeit of an anecdotal nature, that people work very 
hard in “tiger economies” which appears consistent with our model. 
Stafford and Duncan (1980) analyzed time diaries from the mid-1970s in 
the US and showed that effort varied a great deal across worker categories 
and that workers spent a fair amount of their work time not working. While 
these facts do not directly corroborate our results they still suggest that 
effort may vary considerably also over time. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
civil engineer degree relative to years of mandatory schooling has fallen a great deal 
over the last 60-100 years. 
20 This productivity drop may of course have several explanations of which lower effort 
is just one candidate. For instance, Segerstrom (1999) presents a model based on 
increasing difficulties of innovating that is able to theoretically account for this 
phenomenon and the present model offers another explanation. 18 
Mechanisms that reduce the positive growth effect show up in our model. 
In particular, an increase in demand for higher education is consistent with 
the stylized fact that growth rises less than inputs of R&D. As more and 
more workers prefer higher education, the relative supply of R&D workers 
increases over time which not only raises the under utilization rate of R&D 
workers, but it also tends to reduce schooling years of individual R&D 
workers. Human capital per R&D worker thus drops suggesting deviations 
between  measurable inputs of R&D workers and actual human capital 
employed by firms in their laboratories. The results point to the problems 
of correctly measuring R&D inputs as human capital. Obviously, simply 
counting the number of workers employed in firms is not enough; 
knowledge about the share of R&D workers that firms actually allocate to 
R&D and the level of R&D workers’ human capital, as measured by for 
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